The broad objective of this article is to scrutinize the effectiveness of hard law paraphernalia that are there present to protect blockholders of multilateral financial institutions in Zimbabwe. This article focused on descriptive documentary reviews of texts around financial institutions, judicial reports, and Statutory Acts. The study found and revealed that hard laws and regulations yes exist to protect blockholders but the challenge, however, was guaranteeing their enforcement making hard law highly unproductive therefore killing investor confidence in Zimbabwe. The results are quintessential for law enforcement agents, regulators of banks and mangers as they need to craft a quality effective management framework on the protection of blockholders' equity which will attract foreign direct investment and that will promote the country's economic development.
Introduction
The former chairman of US securities Exchange Commission (Arthur Levitt) once said "If a country does not have a reputation for strong corporate governance practices, capital will flow elsewhere. If investors are not confident with the level of disclosure, and legal system capital will flow elsewhere. If a country opts for lax accounting and reporting standards, capital will flow elsewhere." Supporting the above assertion (Sir Adrian Cadbury, UK, Commission Report: Corporate Governance, 1992) also posited that the governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of those resources. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of blockholders, corporations and society.
Corporate governance (CG), phraseology that was only used by a handful academics and shareholders, but has now become the life and soul of business and a staple of discussion in corporate boardrooms, academic meetings, and policy circles around the globe (Becht, Bolton, and Röell, 2003) . Two events have led to the heightening of interest in corporate governance. During the wave of financial crises in 1998 in Russia, Asia, and Brazil, the behavior of the corporate sector affected entire economies, and deficiencies in corporate governance endangered the stability of the global financial system (Becht, Bolton, and Röell, 2003) . Just three years later confidence in the corporate sector was sapped by corporate governance scandals in the United States and Europe that triggered some of the largest insolvencies in history (Becht, Bolton, and Röell, 2003) . In the aftermath, not only has the phrase corporate governance become nearly a household term, but economists, the corporate world, and policymakers everywhere began to recognize the potential macroeconomic consequences of weak corporate governance systems (Aganin et al., 2003) .
The scandals and crises, however, are just manifestations of a number of structural reasons why corporate governance has become more important for economic development and well-being (Becht, Bolton, and Röell, 2003) . The private, market based investment process is now much more important for most economies than it used to be, and that process is underpinned by better corporate governance. At the same time, the allocation of capital has become more complex as investment choices have widened with the opening up and liberalization of financial and real markets, and as structural reforms, including price deregulation and increased competition, have increased companies' exposure to market forces risks (Levine 1997; World Bank 2001) . These developments have made the monitoring of the use of capital more complex in certain ways, enhancing the need for good and strict corporate governance which is the major reason underpinning this research.
This article will do a documentary review of extensive literature on legality and corporate governance in Zimbabwean multilateral blockholder's equity. An array of well established body of research has for some time acknowledged the increased importance of legal foundations, including the quality of the corporate governance framework, for economic development and well-being (La others 1997, 1998) . To the best of my knowledge no research has been done under to the topic, "Corporate Governance: Effectiveness of Zimbabwean Hard Law on Blockholder Protection" The article is mapped as follows: It starts with the methodology, definition of corporate governance and a small description of why corporate is on the radar of governance. A general of overview of corporate governance and the business environment in Africa and the banking sector in Zimbabwe is going to be discussed. Literature review on the evidence of the effectiveness of Zimbabwean hard law on blockholders' equity protection will also be investigated since it is the soul and life of this study.
The article explores recent research texts documenting on how legal or hard law aspects have impact on multilateral institutions and investor confidence. Texts in documentary analysis can be defined broadly as books, financial reports, book chapters, essays, interviews, discussions, newspaper headlines and articles, historical documents, speeches, conversations, advertising, theater, informal conversation, or really any occurrence of communicative language (Creswell, 2002) . The article will conclude by highlighting some main policy and research areas that need further enquiry. The driving force for doing this research is to contribute to the body of research on hard law and governance of corporates especially multilateral institutions issue which has thus far been subjected to insufficient research.
Research Methodology
The philosophy behind any successful research is determined by the methodology that is used. In this case, the descriptive-document philosophical analysis is the qualitative driving methodological approach in this paper. Flick (2002) states that qualitative methods are those that take the researcher's communication with the field and its members as an explicit part of knowledge production. In this grand method, the researcher's subjectivity in the analysis of contributions with regard to good corporate governance is a process to be respected. Mukusha (2011), on descriptive analysis, notes that the object of descriptive research is to portray an accurate profile of persons, events or situations. Thus, the descriptive philosophical analysis as a method is used to reveal the need for sustainable good corporate governance. This article is based on the documentary reviews of countries' multilateral financial institutions. Documents to be reviewed include financial sector policy documents and research articles carried in 
Defining Corporate Governance
The eighteen century literary titan Samuel Johnson (1709-1784), once said, "Definitions to paraphrase are like watches, none is ever exactly correct (Johnson 1709, cited by Greg, 1997) and vary widely. According to (Tarentino, 2009 cited by Butler, & Butler, 2010) corporate governance addresses the process, system and controls by which organizations operate. It also refers to the relationship between those who are governed and those who govern. On a political front it can be regarded as the relationship between the government and its citizens. But Oman (2001) defines corporate governance as referring to the private and public institutions, including laws, regulations and accepted business practice, which in a market economy govern the relationship between corporate managers and entrepreneurs (corporate insiders) on the one hand, and those who invest resources in corporations, on the other hand.
Others consider corporate governance as simply the prevention of theft (Nganga et al., 2003) . Shleifer and Vishny (1996) , state that corporate governance deals with the ways suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment, how they make sure that managers do not steal capital or invest in bad projects. In other words, corporate governance is "the mechanism through which outside investors are protected against expropriation by insiders" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1996) . Insiders, according to this definition, include managers, major shareholders (individuals, other firms, family interests or governments) as well as large creditors such as banks. Outsiders include equity investors, providers of debt and minority shareholders. Thus far, the divide in the discussion of corporate governance seems to be between insiders, those that have a management role in the firm (at either management or board levels) and those that have an interest in the firm but do not have any management roles, generally referred to as outsiders. Nganga et al., (2003) have indicated the many forms that expropriation can take, including outright theft of assets, transfer pricing, excessive executive compensation and diversion of funds to unsuitable projects that benefit one group of insiders. Because of these forms, it becomes inevitable to prevent expropriation through appropriate corporate governance mechanisms and protect small investors from large ones, as well as debt providers from equity investors. Okeahalam and Akinboade, (2003) argues that although in the literature the discussion seems to centre on the relationships that develop within a firm, specifically concerning managers and investors, the concept of corporate governance is much broader than this. It also encompasses the relationship created between the corporation and a firm with its shareholders, the workforce and at large.
They went on to say that corporate governance also encompasses the setting of an appropriate legal, economic and institutional environment that allows companies to pursue long-term shareholder value and maximum human-centered development, while remaining conscious of their other responsibilities to stakeholders, the environment and society in general (Okeahalam and Akinboade, 2003) . Perceived this way, corporate governance (CG) takes a developmental measurement, thus explaining the curiosity that the debate has generated around the world of business. Best corporate governance practice is viewed and now connected with the sophistication of societies. Now the provision of goods across the globe is affected by good governance practices. It is also concerned with the internal processes, systems, practices and procedures as well as formal and informal rules that govern institutions. It concerns the manner in which the rules and regulations are applied and followed, the relationships these rules and regulations determine or create and the nature of these relationships (World Bank, 2003) .
From this discussion it is now very clear that corporate governance must not be viewed only as the maximization of shareholder wealth, but an effort to balance shareholder interests with those of other stakeholders, such as managers, employees, customers, suppliers of corporations' inputs and investors, in order to achieve long-term sustainable value and contributing to the economic development of the countries in which the corporations operate (Dyck et al., 2003) . Since they are so many definitions for corporate governance this study take the definition by According to (Tarentino, 2009 cited by Butler, & Butler, 2010) where corporate governance should addresses the process, system and controls by which organizations operate and governed by regulators and law.
Dimensions of legalization
Abbott and Snidal (2000) distinguish harder from softer international law based on three dimensions:  Obligations. Harder law will have a higher degree of legal obligation, while softer law will have weaker or no legal obligation.  Precision. International law may be written in more or less detailed and precise language. Harder law will have a higher degree of precision, while softer law will use more vague, general or abstract wording.  Delegation. Harder law is more likely to delegate interpretation or enforcement to an independent third party (like an international court or tribunal). Softer law is more likely to keep interpretation or enforcement within the parties, allowing more room for political maneuvering.
Synopsis of corporate governance in Africa
According to Ernst and Young's 2011 "Africa attractive survey" the continent is traditionally viewed as a high-risk continent by international investors. It is often believed that African economies are characterized by macro-economic instability, trade restrictions, and weak institutional environments regarding property rights and the judicial system, and onerous state regulations for economic activities (Imhoff, 2003) . In effect, countries that fail to establish acceptable standards of transparency and governance, within the bounds of good laws and an efficient criminal justice system, lose the trust and support of their citizens and the international community. Such countries find it increasingly difficult to attract trade and foreign investment (Lamberti, & Noci, 2012) . Foreign investors comfortably assess political risk, business risk, market risk and currency risk but they shy away from risks of lawlessness and corruption that all too often results from poor governance. Both of these last two risks impute unpredictability and volatility (Lamberti, & Noci, 2012 
The Financial Sector in Zimbabwe
One of the most important sectors of any economy is the financial sector Chimombe, 1983 ). According to the above assertion financial markets can be understood as a system composed of individuals and 
Multilateral investors or blockholders
According to Barclay and Holderness (1989) , a block holder is someone who owns a large amount of a company's shares and/or bonds, or block. In terms of shares, these owners are often able to influence the company with the voting rights awarded with their holding. For example, if a mutual fund held 10 million shares in a company or 10% of the shares outstanding, they would be a block holder and have considerable influence over who is on the board of directors.
Jones (1992) When freezing money, the Police apply for a subpoena through the courts and the court issues the subpoena instructing the bank or finance house to freeze the money involved. In Zimbabwe, most multilateral banks have security departments. The security departments receive all reports of criminal activities and the department keeps the Police telephone numbers and they in turn contact the Police who would have been attached to banks for three months learning computer systems and banking systems. So that they are well versed in investigating these economic crimes since information is stored on computer.
There are a number of regulations in place to control economic criminal activities and protect shareholders' investment. These are:
1. Prevention of Corruption Act, Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1999). The OECD's Principles of Corporate Governance represent the minimum standards that countries agree upon, without being prescriptive and binding.
They are equally applicable to countries with civil and common law traditions such as Zimbabwe (OECD, 1999). The OECD principles encourage the rights of shareholders (and others) to receive relevant information about the company in a timely manner and equitable treatment of foreign shareholders, among other things. Multilateral banks are also subject to the principles and provisions of the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance Guidelines: (Principles for Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth, 1999). The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe plays an important role in promoting effective corporate governance for banks and similar financial institutions it regulates. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has a strong interest in ensuring that there is effective corporate governance at every bank and financial institution (Reserve bank of Zimbabwe, 2011). However, the excessive supervisory powers vested in the Central Bank are cause for concern by multinational banks. The banks assert these powers are prone to abuse as is currently evidenced where guidelines, policies and codes which are highly 'perishable' are enacted and issued at short notice and with immediate effect (World Bank, 2003).
Commercial Arbitration Centre as Alternative courts
Foreign shareholders can approach the courts directly if their statutory rights are allegedly violated for protecting their rights. In cases of redress against violations (statutory remedies), the Commercial Arbitration Centre (CAC) provides effective alternatives to the courts as a means of recourse for aggrieved shareholders (Banks & Banking Survey, 2006).
The establishment of the CAC in July 1995 has gone a long way towards complementing the administrator of justice in Zimbabwe. Arbitration is now regularly chosen by shareholders of multinational banks as the means of resolving commercial disputes and the superior courts have an enviable record of enforcing arbitrage agreements and awards expeditiously, economically and reliably although some analysts have expressed concern about the effectiveness of the CAC as it only sits as an arbiter in cases where both parties to a dispute have agreed to arbitration in the Articles of Association (Klapper, and Love, 2004 ).
Property rights uncertainty
According to a Business and Banking Survey (2006) there is a lack of security on property rights that currently permeate the banking sector following the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act, (2008) programme which was after the nationalization or indigenization of foreign-owned banks (Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act, 2008). The new bill on property rights states that all multinational companies, including banks operating in Zimbabwe, should compulsorily dispose of a stake of their shareholding to locals in a 51:49 ratio in favor of the locals.
The law gives Zimbabweans the right to take over and control many foreign owned companies in Zimbabwe. The law defines an indigenous Zimbabwean as "any person who before the 18th of April 1980 was disadvantaged by unfair discrimination on the grounds of his or her race, and any descendant of such person (Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act, 2008). According to the World Bank's Doing Business (2012) report; multilateral banks adopted a conservative stance evidenced by the withholding of foreign investment into the Zimbabwe subsidiary. Uncertainty about property rights has played a significant role in dampening investment in the economy (World Bank's Doing Business, 2012). Courts are a last resort for shareholders due to their ineffectiveness in protecting shareholders' rights and so multinational banks have experienced the absence of foreign participation, technology transfer and skills shortage because of intellectual capital flight.
Institute of Directors Zimbabwe (IoDZ)
Most of the multilateral banks are active members of the IoDZ, a body with corporate governance that is gaining recognition in the country largely due to its efforts of promoting the principles set out in the Cadbury Report of UK, the King Report of South Africa and UK Code of Best Practice developed by the Commonwealth Secretariat and derived from the OECD's Corporate Governance Code (IoDZ, 1993 
Law enforcement challenge in Zimbabwe
According to the Banks & Banking Survey (2006), corporate governance is not credible unless laws are applied effectively. And for this to happen, regulators must have sufficient authority and resources. The review of the regulatory framework for multinational banks in Zimbabwe indicates that, in most cases, reasonable regulations have been put in place to achieve the key objectives of corporate governance, particularly in the areas of board composition, disclosures, board sizes and internal audit committees' independence (Banks & Banking Survey, 2006). However, the effectiveness of these rules depends on the ability of the regulatory agencies to enforce, that is, to execute a process that provides restitution when rules are broken.
Anecdotal evidence indicates that enforcement of rules and regulations is increasingly challenged by a weak judiciary system, making it difficult to obtain convictions when rules are violated. Thus, banks or financial regulators can work hard to administer the law and identify violators but the normal process of enforcement is not equipped to apply the new laws. The commercial law system in Zimbabwe is thus perceived to be inefficient (Banks & Banking Survey, 2006). Enforcement of laws via courts assumes that: courts have resources to handle cases in a timely way, and judges understand the banking sector and new legal concepts well enough to enforce the law. The Banks & Banking Survey (2006) has not that the judiciary in Zimbabwe is plagued by weaknesses that include:  Politicization and lack of independence  corruption and low remuneration (low morale)  Too few judges, staff and lawyers with little commercial expertise (brain drain)  Ignorance of the legal system, hence a slow and patchy process to obtain a satisfactory resolution due to backlogged courts, and  Bias or selectivity in judgments due to corrupt court officials and judges.
15.Findings
To a large extent the legal and institutional framework for effective corporate governance, including the protection of foreign shareholders, exists in Zimbabwe by virtue of laws such as those related to Companies Act, Banking Act, and various Codes. The problem, however, lies with enforcement, which appears to be weak or non-existent in most instances (World Bank's Doing Business, 2012).
Conclusions
The banking sector appears generally to be overregulated, volatile, risky, corruption-infested, and susceptible to political interference through takeovers by the government (nationalization) or closure by the Central Bank at any time. The regulatory framework for the protection of foreign shareholders is there and only needs enforcement for it to be effective. The legal framework in Zimbabwe needs to be improved to ensure that banks play a more active corporate governance role albeit laws and regulations, particularly, those relating to bankruptcy, are difficult to enforce. Even where collateral is available, it is not easy for banks to realize such collateral. As argued by Cooter (1996) , among others, who emphasizes that there needs to be social support for legal reforms to have an impact. In states and/or locations where laws are consistent with social norms: 'the law is obeyed out of respect. Under such a system, private citizens supplement official enforcement of the law, which is critical because officials lack the information and motivation to enforce the law effectively on their own.' Critically, Cooper argues that legal protection will simply be ignored where the legal protection is inconsistent with social norms. The Central Bank has too much power at executive and supervisory levels, which is prone to abuse. This is to the detriment of the shareholders as well as the entire national financial system. Internally, the legal mechanisms and the structure of banks to protect shareholders are highly robust and effective. The CAC's effectiveness is limited to those entities with arbitration clauses in their Articles of Association.
Recommendations and areas for further research
Through its various ministries, for example, the Ministries of Industry and International Trade, Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, the Zimbabwean government should consider adopting and upholding the rule of law and court decisions. The government needs to abide by the rules of the Constitution carefully and strictly (Banks and Banking Survey, 2006 Bulletin). The rule of law helps to attract foreign direct investment, increase shareholder investment and protection, promote activism in the economy and offer a safe haven for foreign shareholder investment.
This will greatly help to resuscitate all sectors of the economy, including the banking sector, which happens to be key in financial intermediation. There is a need to strength the enforcement mechanisms of regulatory instruments and the judicial system to restore shareholder confidence in the rule of law (Banks and Banking Survey 2006 Bulletin). Government needs to show political will by committing time and money to the processes and structures of protecting multinational companies and their shareholders.
Community watchdogs for example the establishment of strong monitoring and watchdog organizations on corporate governance and shareholder protection can also be an effective legal protection mechanism capable of protecting shareholder value and investment. Two areas of further research are suggested (a) The relationship between shareholder activism and bank performance, (b) Blockholdism, corporate governance and bank performance.
